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ABSTRACT 
 
Durable Goods, Price Indexes, and Monetary Policy. (August 2008) 
Kyoung Soo Han, B.A., Yonsei University; M.A., Yonsei University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dennis Jansen 
 
 The dissertation studies the relationship among durable goods, price indexes and 
monetary policy in two sticky-price models with durable goods. One is a one-sector 
model with only durable goods and the other is a two-sector model with durable and 
non-durable goods.  
In the models with durable goods, the COLI (Cost of Living Index) and the PPI 
(Producer Price Index) identical to the CPI (Consumer Price Index) measured by the 
acquisitions approach are distinguished, and the COLI/PPI ratio plays an important rule 
in monetary policy transmission. The welfare function based on the household utility can 
be represented by a quadratic function of the quasi-differenced durables-stock gaps and 
the PPI inflation rates. In the one-sector model, the optimal policy maximizing welfare is 
to keep the (acquisition) price and the output gap at a constant rate which does not 
depend on the durability of consumption goods. In the two-sector model with sticky 
prices, the central bank has only one policy instrument, so it cannot cope with distortions 
in both sectors. Simulation results show that the PPI is an adequate price index for 
monetary policy and that a policy of targeting core inflation constructed by putting more 
weight on prices in the sector producing more durable goods is near optimal.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most frequently used assumptions in economics, especially in 
macroeconomics, is that consumption goods are perishable, non-storable. Using the 
assumption of perishable goods, macroeconomic researchers have focused mainly on 
non-durables and service sectors but have paid little attention to the durables sector. This 
tradition seems to be justifiable since the share of the durable goods sector in the gross 
domestic production (GDP) is quite smaller than those of the non-durables and service 
sectors.1  
However, consumer durables matter in economy and deserve more attention from 
economic researchers. First of all, in the economy with durables, the relative importance 
of some sector cannot be properly measured by its fraction of the GDP. Since the 
consumer derives utility from the stock of durables rather than the flow of the durables, 
the consumer’s preference on durable goods cannot be well represented by the flow 
variables like the level of production in a specific period. The relative importance of the 
durable goods sector implied by utility functions is usually greater than when evaluated 
by the share of its production in the GDP. Moreover, the many empirical results, 
including Erceg and Levin (2006), and Monacelli (2008), show that the consumption of 
durable goods is more sensitive to interest rates and explains a large part of business 
                                                          
This dissertation follows the style and format of the Journal of International Economics. 
 
1 The share of the durable goods sector in the U.S. GDP is around 12.5% in Erceg and Levin 
(2006). 
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cycles. Thus, business cycle models, only with consumer non-durables, have limitations 
to explain the observed economic fluctuations. 
Recently some studies have paid attention to the role of durable goods in 
macroeconomic models. Barsky et al. (2007) study the role of price stickiness in a model 
with durable and non-durable goods, and argue that sticky price models cannot explain 
the fact that the consumption of durables responds procyclically during the periods of 
economic expansion without the price stickiness of durable goods. Campbell and 
Hercowitz (2005), and Monacelli (2008) examine the role of collateralized debt in a 
business cycle model and a New Keynesian model with durable goods, respectively. 
Erceg and Levin (2006) compare the performance of alternative monetary policies in a 
sticky price model with durable and non-durable goods, and show that a policy targeting 
an appropriately weighted average of aggregate wage and price inflation performs better 
than a policy stabilizing final goods price inflation. 
Even though these studies have contributed in extending and deepening our 
understanding about the role of durable goods in business cycles and monetary policy, 
they have overlooked alternative approaches2 to measure price indexes in an economy 
with durable goods. They have, then, neglected the importance of the relation between 
price indexes and monetary policy. All of the above mentioned studies follow the 
acquisitions approach to price indexes in that the price index is a weighted average of 
prices of both durable and non-durable goods; the weights used are the share of each 
                                                          
2  According to Diewert (2003), there are the acquisitions, rental equivalence and user cost 
approaches to treat consumer durables in a consumer price index (CPI). Assuming complete 
rental markets for durable goods, the rental equivalence approach is equivalent to the user cost 
approach. 
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sector in the nominal GDP. Despite of its simplicity, the acquisitions approach is not 
clearly based on the consumer theory that leads to a cost of living index (COLI). The 
COLI in a general equilibrium model can be derived from the user cost approach to price 
indexes. The latter defines the CPI as a weighted average of the price of the non-durable 
good and the user cost of the durable good.3  
The main purpose of this dissertation is to examine the relationship among 
durable goods, price indexes and monetary policy in a sticky price model. Recently 
many central banks have adopted a policy of inflation targeting. An inflation-targeting 
central bank announces its inflation target and has the responsibility to keep the growth 
rate of a specific price index around the target. However, the choice of which price index 
shall the central bank stabilize is not apparent, since there are many alternative measures 
to pick from in an economy with durable goods. This dissertation investigates which 
price index is more appropriate for the undertaking of monetary policy.  
In addition, this dissertation exploits the implications of introducing durable 
goods in a sticky-price model as in Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). I focus on two ways to 
introduce durable goods into macroeconomic models. One simple way is to formulate a 
one-sector model where only one durable consumption good exists; the durable goods 
can be thought of as a composite good of a variety of durable and non-durable goods. 
The second way is to build a two-sector model where one sector produces durable goods 
and the other sector yields non-durable goods. While using a one-sector model is more 
tractable for examining the aggregate effects of monetary shocks, it provides limited 
                                                          
3 The user cost of durable consumption goods is defined as the cost of using the services of the 
durable good during the period under consideration. 
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insight on explaining the alternative choices for undertaking monetary policy when 
central banks face a tradeoff between the durables sector and the non-durables sector. 
Since the consumption of durable goods responds more sensitively to monetary policy 
shocks, it is often observed that loose (tight) monetary policy during a recession (boom) 
causes a significant increase (decrease) in the consumption of durable goods while other 
sectors are still in recession (boom). 
Chapter II examines the implications for optimal monetary policy of introducing 
consumer durables into a general equilibrium model with sticky prices. It generalizes a 
standard one-sector sticky-price model by eliminating the restriction that consumption 
goods are perishable. In the model with durable goods, the COLI and the PPI are 
naturally distinguished and the COLI/PPI ratio plays an important role in monetary 
policy transmission.4 The social welfare can be expressed as a quadratic function of the 
quasi-differenced durables-stock gap and the PPI inflation rate. Although the 
introduction of durable goods changes the dynamics of the log-linear equilibrium and the 
form of the social welfare function, the policy that maximizes social welfare is to keep 
the price and the output gap at a constant rate which does not depend on the durability of 
consumption goods. Without cost-push shocks, a policy completely stabilizing inflation 
is also optimal. 
Chapter III studies the implications of consumption goods with heterogeneous 
durability for the monetary policy that maximizes the social welfare. It formulates a two-
sector sticky-price model where two sectors produce consumption goods with 
                                                          
4 The CPI measured by the acquisitions approach and the PPI are identical in the dissertation. 
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heterogeneous durability. Compared to two-sector models with only non-durable goods, 
the COLI/PPI ratio and the relative user cost play important roles in monetary policy 
transmission. The social welfare can be represented by a quadratic function of a 
weighted average of the sectoral quasi-differenced durables-stock gaps and the sectoral 
PPI inflation rates. The relative weight on the sectoral durables-stock gaps is a 
decreasing function of its depreciation rate. This implies that the central bank should 
implement monetary policy focusing more on the sector producing more durable goods. 
In this two-sector model, monetary policy cannot stabilize both sectors simultaneously 
since the central bank has only one policy instrument. The chapter shows that it is 
optimal to stabilize core inflation constructed by giving more weight on prices in the 
sector producing more durable goods. In addition, the numerical results show that the 
central bank should target to stabilize an adequately weighted average of the sectoral PPI 
inflation rates rather than the sectoral COLI inflation rates. 
The rest of the dissertation is structured as the following. Chapter II exploits the 
implications of optimal monetary policy by introducing consumer durables into a one-
sector sticky-price model. Chapter III studies a two-sector general equilibrium model 
with sticky price. Summary and concluding remarks are in Chapter IV. 
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CHAPTER II 
IMPLICATIONS OF DURABLE GOODS  
FOR OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY 
 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the implications for optimal monetary 
policy of introducing consumer durables into a general equilibrium model with sticky 
prices. Section 1 generalizes a standard one-sector New Keynesian model by eliminating 
the assumption that consumption goods are only perishable. Thus consumption goods 
are durable and accumulated, and households derive utility from services provided by 
the stock of durable goods. In the model, the COLI and the PPI are distinguished and the 
COLI/PPI ratio plays an important role.  
In section 2, the log-linear approximation to the equilibrium is presented. 
Assuming price stickiness as in Calvo (1983), I derive a variant of the New-Keynesian 
Phillips Curve, in which inflation depends on the real interest rate gap as well as the 
output gap.  
Section 3 shows that taking a second-order approximation to the discounted sum 
of period utilities, the central bank’s period-loss can be expressed as a quadratic function 
of the durables-stock gap and the inflation rate measured by the acquisitions approach.  
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Even though the introduction of durable goods changes the dynamics of log-linear 
equilibrium and the form of the period-loss function, the optimal policy is to keep the 
price/output gap ratio constant as in the standard model. 
Finally, section 4 evaluates the performance of several targeting rules and 
instrument rules. The results show that the central bank should target to stabilize the 
inflation rates measured by the acquisitions approach instead of the COLI inflation rates 
and that inflation targeting rules yield better outcomes rules stabilizing the output gaps in 
terms of the social welfare. 
 
1. THE BASELINE MODEL 
 
There are a large number of identical and infinitely-lived households. The 
representative household derives utility from services provided by the stock of a single 
final durable good while he derives disutility from supplying labor. The final durable 
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good is a composite of differentiated intermediate goods. Intermediate goods are 
perishable, and the production of intermediate goods requires only labor as an input. 
Stylistically, this set-up can be production of a durable good, housing, produced by labor 
(and perhaps a free material product). 
Money can be introduced via a money-in-utility function approach. However, 
since the central bank will determine the interest rate via a monetary policy rule, the 
central bank will always supply enough money to meet money demand at any nominal 
interest rate. Thus, if utility is additively separable in real money balances,5 and if the 
utility of real balances is small enough, the effect of money balances can be ignored. 
Thus the model can be considered cashless. 
 
1.1. The Representative Household 
The objective of the representative household is to maximize a lifetime utility 
function given by 
 
1
0 0
0
( ) ( ( ))t t t
t
E u K v H i diβ∞
=
⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∫  (2.1) 
Here E  is the expectation operator, 0 1β< <  is the discount factor, tK  is the stock of 
the final durable good, and ( )tH i  is the quantity of labor of type i supplied to 
intermediate producer i in period t. 
                                                          
5 If utility is separable in money balances, the money balances have no effect for the rest of the 
model. 
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In each period, the household purchases tD  units of the final durable good at 
price tP . The stock of the final durable good evolves according to the following law of 
accumulation 
 1(1 )t t tK K Dδ −= − +  (2.2) 
where 0 1δ< ≤  denotes the depreciation rate of the final good. In the limiting case of 
1δ = , the model corresponds to the traditional one with a non-durable consumption 
good. 
The household’s budget constraint in period t is   
 
1 1
1 1 0 0
( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t t t t tB R B PD W i H i di i di T− −≤ − + + Π −∫ ∫  (2.3) 
Here tB  is the nominal value of (net) bond holdings (whether privately issued or claims 
to the government) which is the numeraire in the economy, tR  is the nominal interest 
rate paid on a riskless bond held at the end of period t, ( )tW i  is the nominal wage paid to 
labor of type i, ( )t iΠ  is the nominal profit from sales of intermediate good i, and tT  
represents net lump-sum tax collections by the government.  
Combining with (2.2), the budget constraint (2.3) can be rewritten as 
 
1 1
1 1 1 0 0
( (1 ) ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t t t t t tB R B P K K W i H i di i di Tδ− − −≤ − − − + + Π −∫ ∫  (2.4) 
Solving the household’s utility maximization problem gives the Euler equation 
and the labor supply equation:  
 1 1( ) 1
( )
k t t
k t t t
u K Q
u K R Qβ
+ +=  (2.5) 
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 ( ( )) ( )
( )
h t t
k t t
v H i W i
u K Q
=  (2.6) 
for [0,1]i∈ , where ku  is the marginal utility of the durables-stock, hv  is the marginal 
disutility of working, and the user cost of consumer durable is defined as   
 1(1 ) tt t t
t
PQ P E
R
δ +−≡ −  (2.7) 
where the second term in the RHS represents the discounted resale value of consumer 
durables. Equations (2.5) and (2.6) are similar to the first-order conditions for the 
household’s maximization problem in a standard consumer problem except the user cost 
takes the place of the durable good price, which implies the user cost approach is 
appropriate when we have durable goods in the CPI. The user cost can be interpreted as 
the (true) cost of living index (COLI) 6.  
 
                                                          
6 Hereafter the consumer price index measured by the user cost approach is called the ‘COLI’. 
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1.2. Firms and Price Setting  
1.2.1. Final Good Producer 
The final durable good producer is assumed to behave competitively. The final 
good firm uses a continuum of intermediate goods ( )tY i  to produce output tY , according 
to the following constant elasticity substitution (CES) technology 
 
1 11
0
( )t tY Y i di
θ
θ θ
θ
− −⎡ ⎤≡ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ , (2.8) 
where θ>1 the elasticity of substitution across differentiated intermediate goods.  
Solving the final good producer’s profit-maximization problem, taking the final 
good price tP  and intermediate goods prices ( )tP i  as given, yields demand functions 
for the typical intermediate good i: 
 ( )( ) ( ) /t t t tY i P i P Yθ−= , (2.9) 
The aggregate price consistent with the final good producer earning zero profits is given 
by 
 
1
1 11
0
( )t tP P i di
θθ −−⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  (2.10) 
The aggregate price of intermediate goods is called the PPI, which here is identical to a 
CPI measured by the acquisitions approach.7 
 
 
                                                          
7 While the COLI and the PPI is not distinguished in a standard model, the COLI and the PPI 
need to be distinguished in this model with durables.  
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1.2.2. Intermediate Good Producers 
Intermediate goods producers behave as monopolistic competitors. Each of the 
differentiated intermediate goods uses a specialized labor input in its production. The 
technology for producing intermediate goods type i is 
 ( ) ( )t t tY i A H i=  (2.11) 
Note that by assumption the time-varying exogenous technology factor 0tA >  is 
identical across intermediate suppliers. 
The total cost of supplying a quantity ( )tY i  of good i is then given by 
 ( ) ( ) /t t tW i Y i A  (2.12) 
Differentiating this with respect to ( )tY i  and combining the labor supply equation 
(2.6), the nominal marginal cost (NMC) of supplying good i is equal to  
 ( ( ) / )( )
( )
h t t t
t
k t t
v Y i A QNMC i
u K A
=  (2.13) 
The real marginal cost of providing good i is then defined as 
 ( ) ( ( ) / )( )
( )
t h t t t
t
t k t t t
MC i v Y i A QMC i
P u K A P
≡ =  (2.14) 
In a standard model, the COLI/PPI ratio has no effect on the real marginal cost since the 
COLI is identical to the PPI. In contrast, in this model with durables, the COLI and the 
PPI are distinguished, and thus the real wages, /t tW Q  and /t tW P  evaluated by the 
household and producers, respectively, will generally have different values. An increase 
in the COLI/PPI ratio raises the real marginal cost through increases in the real wage 
since it generates excess demand in labor markets by lowering the real wage as 
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evaluated by the household or by increasing the real wage as evaluated by the 
intermediate good suppliers (or both). In addition, log-linearization shows that the 
COLI/PPI ratio is an increasing function of the real interest rates measured by the 
acquisitions approach. 
Real effects of monetary policy to the model are introduced by assuming prices 
of the intermediate goods are sticky in a form given by Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). 
Each supplier can choose its new price with probability 0 1 1γ< − <  in a given period, 
while it keeps its old price fixed with probability γ .  
Taking the price index and the demand function as given, a monopolistically 
competitive supplier that changes its price in period t chooses its new price ( )tP i  to 
maximize the expected present value of its profit 
 , , ,
0
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )kt t t k t t t k t t k
k
E P i MC i Y iγ λ τ∞ + + +
=
⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦∑  (2.15) 
where , ( ( ) / ) /( ( ) / )
k
t t k k t k t k k t tu K Q u K Qλ β+ + += , τ  is a subsidy to intermediate good 
producers, ( ), ( ) ( ) /t t k t k t t kY i Y P i P θ−+ + += , and ,, ( ( ) / )( ) ( )h t t k t k t kt t k k t k t k
v Y i A QNMC i
u K A
+ + +
+
+ +
= .  
The first order condition for the optimal choice of *tP  is given by  
 * * *, ,
0
(1 ) 0kt t t k t t k t t k
k
E P NMC Yγ λ τ μ∞ + + +
=
⎡ ⎤+ − =⎣ ⎦∑  (2.16) 
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where / ( 1)μ θ θ≡ −  denotes the markup, 
*
,* ( / )
( )
h t t k t k t k
t k
k t k t k
v Y A QNMC
u K A
+ + +
+
+ +
= , and 
( )* *, /t t k t k t t kY Y P P θ−+ + += . This implies that firms set their price equal to a discounted sum 
of expected nominal marginal cost. 
It is notable that under the flexible-price regime, i.e., 0γ = , an intermediate good 
supplier will set its price equal to a proportional markup over nominal marginal cost: 
 
1t t
P MCμτ= +  (2.17) 
As a fraction γ  of prices are fixed, the price index evolves according to   
 
1
*1 1 1
1(1 )t t tP P P
θ θ θγ γ− − −−⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦  (2.18) 
 
1.3. Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
The fiscal authority chooses a subsidy rate τ that maximizes the utility of the 
domestic household in a zero inflation steady state. Meanwhile, the central bank 
determines the short-term nominal interest rate by a time-invariant commitment rule. 
The monetary authority (the government and the central bank) supplies bonds in 
amounts enough to meet bond demand at the target nominal-interest rate. 
The budget constraint of the monetary authority in period t is given by 
 
1
1 1 0
( ) ( )t t t t t tB R B T P i Y i diτ− −− + = ∫  (2.19) 
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1.4. Market Clearing Conditions 
The market clearing conditions (labor, intermediate goods, final good, and bond 
markets) in the model economy are given by 
 d st t tH H H= =  
( ) ( ) ( )d st t tY i Y i Y i= =  
t tD Y=  
 d st t tB B B= =   
Here the superscripts d and s implies demand and supply, respectively. 
Walras’ law holds in the model economy. Suppose labor and intermediate goods 
markets are in equilibrium. Then combining the household’s budget constraint and the 
profit functions of intermediate suppliers yields the bond demand function in the form8 
 
1 1
1 1 0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dt t t t t t t t t tB R B T P i Y i di P i Y i di PDτ− −= − + + −∫ ∫  (2.20) 
Rearranging the government budget constraint, one has the bond supply function 
                                                          
8 The profit function of intermediate supplier of type i is given by 
 
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t ti P i Y i W i H iτΠ = + −  
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given by  
 
1
1 1 0
( ) ( )st t t t t tB R B T P i Y i diτ− −= − + ∫  (2.21) 
Combining the bond market clearing condition ( d st tB B= ), (2.20) and (2.21) 
gives  
  
1
0
( ) ( )t t t tP i Y i di PD=∫  (2.22) 
From the zero profit condition of the final good producer, (2.22) can be rewritten 
as  
 t tY D=  (2.23) 
Equation (2.23) is the final good market clearing condition. Thus Walras’ law holds in 
the model. 
 
 
2. EQUILIBRIUM 
 
For a real variable tX , we define log( / )
n
t tx X X= , log( / )t tx X X= , and  
ˆ log( / )nt t tx X X= , where X  and ntX  are the steady state value and the natural level of 
tX , respectively.  
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2.1. Steady-State Equilibrium  
If there is no shock, the model has a unique stationary equilibrium (with no 
inflation) described by  
 1/R β=  (2.24) 
 D Y=  (2.25) 
 H Y=  (2.26) 
 Y Kδ=  (2.27) 
 1(1 )h
k
v
u q
= −Φ  (2.28) 
where 1 (1 ) /τ μ−Φ ≡ + , and / 1 (1 )q Q P β δ≡ = − − . 
 
2.2. Flexible-Price Equilibrium 
When prices are flexible, monetary policy is neutral, and thus real variables are 
affected only by real disturbances (called productivity shocks in our model). In flexible-
price equilibrium, quantities and prices of each differentiated good are equal: 
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( )t tY i Y= , and ( )t tP i P=  
The flexible price equilibrium can be represented by the following linearized 
system:  
 1 1 (1 ) 0At t t t
qk y rr a
q
σ ω ω− −+ + − + =  (2.29) 
 1
C
t t t tk E k rrσ+= −  (2.30) 
 ( )11 (1 )t t ty k kδδ −= − −  (2.31) 
 ( )11 (1 )C A At t t trr rr q E rrq += − −  (2.32) 
Here / ( )k kku Kuσ ≡ −  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of private 
expenditure, and /hh hHv vω ≡  is the elasticity of marginal disutility of work. I denote 
with Atrr  and 
C
trr  the natural rates of interest measured by the acquisitions approach 
and by the user cost approach, respectively.9 (2.29) is the price-setting equation under 
the flexible-price regime, (2.30) is the Euler equation, (2.31) is the law of accumulation 
for durable goods, and (2.32) is the relationship between real interest rates by the 
acquisitions approach and the user cost approach. If the final good is not storable (e.g., 
non-durable goods or services) so that 1qδ = = , then (2.29) is reduced to 
1
1
t t tk y a
ω
σ ω−
+= = + , which implies the natural rate of consumption of non-durables 
                                                          
9  In a model with durables, Ctrr  is corresponding to what Woodford (2000) has called 
Wicksellian real interest rate. 
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depends on only current technology shocks. In contrast, the natural rate of durables 
depends on both the present and past technology shocks.  
Assuming the technology shocks ,j ta  are stationary, the natural rate of the 
durable good stock evolves according to the following process (derived in appendix A) 
 ( ) ( )1 2 1 1 1(1 ) (1 )t t t t t t tk E k k a q E aη η ω+ − +− + = + − −  (2.33) 
or, equivalently, 
 ( ) ( ){ } ( )2 1 1 1(1 ) (1 )t t t t t t t tk k E k k a q E aη υ βυ υ ωυ − + +− + − = + − −  (2.34) 
where ( )1 21 1 (1 ) ( / )qη σ β δ ω δ−⎡ ⎤= + + −⎣ ⎦ , 2 (1 )( / )η δ ω δ= − , and 0 1υ δ< < −  is the 
smaller root of the quadratic equation    
 21 2 ( 1)ηυ η βυ= +   
For example, suppose ta  follows an AR(1) process of the form  
 1 ,t a t a ta aρ ε−= +  (2.35) 
Here the error term ,a tε  is identically and independently distributed. Then the natural 
rate of the durables-stock evolves according to the following AR(2) process 
 1t t tk k aυ −= +  (2.36) 
where 1(1 )t ta aω ζ −= + , and 1 2 ( )1 (1 )
η βη υ ρζ βρ δ
− += − − . 
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2.3. Sticky-Price Equilibrium 
The log-linearization of the Euler equation and of the law of accumulation of 
durable goods around the zero-inflation steady-state, respectively, are given by  
 ( )1 1Ct t t t t tk E k r Eσ π+ += − −  (2.37) 
 ( )11 (1 )t t ty k kδδ −= − −  (2.38) 
Here ( )1log /Ct t tQ Qπ −≡  is the COLI inflation rate, and the real interest rate measured 
by the user cost can be rewritten as 
 ( )1 11 (1 )C C A At t t t t t trr r E E rr q rrqπ + +≡ − = − −  (2.39) 
where 1
A A
t t t trr r E π +≡ −  is the real interest rate measured by the acquisitions approach, 
and ( )1log /At t tP Pπ −≡  is the PPI inflation rate.  
Combining (2.30) and (2.37) with definitions of real interest rates, one obtains 
 1 1 1
1 1ˆ ˆ ( ) ( )A A A At t t t t t t t
qk E k rr rr E rr rr
q q
σ+ + +⎛ ⎞−= − − − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (2.40) 
Log-linearizing to (2.15) and (2.18) yields a variant of the New Keynesian 
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Phillips Curve given by (derived in appendix A) 
 11
1ˆ ˆ ( )A A A At t t t t t t
qE k y rr rr
q
π β π ϕ σ ω−+ ⎛ ⎞−= + + + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (2.41) 
where (1 )(1 )
(1 )
γ γβϕ γ ωθ
− −≡ + . The supply curve shows inflation in the economy with 
durables depends positively on real interest rates and log-deviation of the durables-stock 
from its natural level as well as positively on the output gap. Current and future real 
interest rates have a positive effect on PPI inflation through the COLI/PPI ratio. Under 
the assumption of perishable good, i.e., 1δ = , (2.41) reduces to a standard New-
Keynesian Phillips curve 
 11 ˆ( )
A A
t t t tE yπ β π ϕ σ ω−+= + +  
Using (2.31), (2.38), and (2.40) to substitute for the output gap and interest rate 
terms in (2.41), the supply equation can be rewritten equivalently in the form 
 ( )1 1 2 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 ) ( ) ( )A A A A St t t t t t t k t t t tE q E E k k k kπ β π π β π χ υ βυ υ+ + + − +⎡ ⎤= + − − + − − −⎣ ⎦  (2.42) 
where 2 /
S
kχ ϕη υ≡ , and υ  and 2η are defined in (2.34). Equations (2.40), (2.42), and 
the monetary policy rule choosing tr  determine the equilibrium path of  tˆk , 
A
tπ , and tr .  
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3. OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY  
 
3.1. The Objective of Monetary Policy 
The optimal commitment monetary policy rule will maximize the representative 
household’s expected lifetime utility given by 
 0 0 0W U V≡ − , (2.43) 
where 0 0
0
( )t t
t
U E u Kβ∞
=
≡ ∑ , and 10 0 0
0
( ( ))t t
t
V E v H i diβ∞
=
≡ ∑ ∫ . 
Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), I take a second-order Taylor 
approximation of the welfare function (2.43) around the steady state values with zero 
inflation.  A second-order approximation of the discounted sum of utility around the 
steady state values is given by (derived in appendix A) 
 ( )30
0
. .tk t
t
W Ku L t i p O a
q
δ θ βϕ
∞
=
= − + +∑  (2.44) 
Here the term t.i.p. denotes terms that are independent of monetary policy, ( )3O a  
denotes the terms that are of third or higher order in the deviations of the various 
variables from their steady-state values, and the period-loss function is given by 
 ( ) ( )2 21ˆ ˆL At k t t tL k kχ υ π−= − + . (2.45) 
where 2Lk
ηϕχ θ δυ≡  is the relative weight on the durables-stock gap variability. Equation 
(2.45) reduced to the period-loss function ( )1 22( ) ˆ At tyϕ σ ω πθ
− + +  in a standard model 
 23
when 1δ = . Comparing with a standard model, 1ˆ ˆt tk kυ −−  takes the place of the output 
gap in the period-loss function. Taking into account that 0 1υ δ< < − , it implies that 
once the durables-stock deviates from its natural level, it should be adjusted gradually to 
its natural level. In the extreme case of 0υ = , only the current durables-stock matters so 
that the current level of durables-stock should be always stabilized around its natural 
level, ignoring inflation variability. If 1υ δ= − , it is optimal that the central bank 
stabilizes current output around its natural level as in a standard model.  
In addition, it is notable that comparing with habit formation models as in Amato 
and Laubach (2001), and Giannoni and Woodford (2003), introduction of durable goods 
has an opposite effect on the period-loss function. Suppose the level of output in the 
previous period is greater than its natural level. Then it is desirable that the current level 
of output should also be higher than its natural level in a model with habit formation 
since the period-loss can be written as  
 ( ) ( )2 21ˆ ˆh h h At y t t tL y yχ υ π−= − +  
where 0 1hυ< < . However, if the previous output gap is greater than zero, the current 
output should be lower than its natural level in a model with durables because the 
period-loss can be rewritten as 
 ( ) ( )2 21
0
ˆ ˆ(1 ) (1 )L k At k t t k t
k
L y yχ δ δ δ υ δ π∞ − −
=
⎛ ⎞= + − − − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
Note that 0 (1 ) 1δ υ< − − < .  
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3.2. Optimal Monetary Policy 
An optimal monetary policy seeks to minimize the discounted sum of losses 
(2.45) subject to the sticky-price equilibrium given by equations (2.40) and (2.41). The 
Lagrangian for this problem is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
2 2
1 1, 1
0 1 1 2
0
2,
1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ2
(1 )
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
L A C C
k t t t t t t t t t
t A A A A
t t t t t t t
t
t S
k t t t t t
k k k E k rr rr
E E q E E
k k E k k
χ υ π φ σ
β π β π π β π
φ χ υ βυ υ
− +
∞
+ + +
=
− +
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤− + + − + −⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎪⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤− − − −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪+ ⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪− − − −⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
∑  (2.46) 
First order necessary conditions with respect to Ctrr , 1ˆ ˆt tk kυ −− , and Atπ   are given 
by 
 1, 0tφ =  (2.47) 
 ( ) ( )1 2, 2, 1ˆ ˆw t t t tk k πχ υ χ φ υφ− −− = −  (2.48) 
 2, 2, 1 2, 2(2 ) (1 ) 0
A
t t t tπ φ δ φ δ φ− −+ − − + − =  (2.49) 
for each 0t ≥ . Following Woodford (1999), the optimal policy under a timeless 
perspective is that the central bank implements conditions (2.48) and (2.49) for all 
periods. Hence, the system of the economy under an optimal policy can be represented 
by equations (2.42), (2.48), and (2.49) given initial conditions, 1ˆ 0k− =  and 
2, 2 2, 1 0φ φ− −= = .  
Combining (2.48) and (2.49), PPI inflation and the output gap under the optimal 
policy satisfy  
 1 1
1 ˆ ˆ( ) (1 )( ) 0A At t t tL y yπ υπ υθ− −− + − − =  (2.50) 
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where L is the lag operator.  
Note that if there is no uncertainty which generates monetary policy to deviate 
from the optimal rule, equation (2.50) can reduce to the optimal policy rule in a standard 
model given by 
 1 ˆ(1 ) 0At tL yπ θ −+ − =  (2.51) 
which implies that the optimal policy maximizing the social welfare is to keep the 
(acquisition) price and the output gap at a constant rate that does not depend on the  
durability of goods. 
Cost-push shocks make the central bank face the conflicting goals of stabilizing 
both inflation and the output gap simultaneously. Here we have no cost-push shocks, so 
the strict inflation targeting is also an optimal monetary policy. In the next section, cost-
push shocks are introduced into the supply equation (2.41) as in Clarida, Gali, and 
Gertler (1999) in order to compare a set of targeting rules and instrument rules. 
   
4. NUMERICAL RESULTS 
 
In this section, I compare several targeting rules and instrument rules with the 
optimal rule derived in the previous section. Section 4.1 calibrates the structural 
parameters and the shock processes in the model used for numerical analysis. Section 4.2 
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explains the results of numerical analysis. I use the AIM algorithm to solve rational 
expectation models in this section. 10   
 
4.1. Calibration 
The calibrated values are summarized in Table 1. Based on the empirical results 
of Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), I calibrate structural parameters and the shock 
processes of the model to simulate data at a quarterly frequency.  
The discount factor β is set to the conventional value of 0.99 which implies the 
annual real interest rate of 4%. I set γ =0.66, so an average lifetime of price contracts is 
three quarters. An average markup in goods markets is 15%. Thus θ is set to 7.88. 
Following Amato and Laubach (2001), I set ω=0.60 which is consistent with a Frisch 
elasticity of 5 and a Cobb-Douglas production technology with a coefficient on labor of 
0.75. I assume the period utility is a log function, so σ is set to 1. The depreciation rate 
of durable goods is set to 0.40 which implies the annual depreciation rate of 87%,  
                                                          
10 The AIM is Anderson and Moore (1985) implementation of the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) 
method, modified to take advantage of sparse matrix functions.  
 
Table 1 
Calibrated parameter values in the baseline model 
β 0.99 δ 0.40 
γ 0.66 ρa 0.900 
θ 7.88 sd(a) 0.036 
σ 1.00 ρμ 0.900 
ω 0.60 sd(μ) 0.036 
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corresponding to the share of the non-durables sector in the U.S GDP. Finally, 
technology and cost-push shocks are assumed to independently follow AR(1) processes 
with the coefficients (ρa and ρμ) of 0.90 and the conditional standard deviations (sd(a) 
and sd(μ)) of 0.036.  
 
4.2. Results 
Table 2 reports welfare losses (the last column) and unconditional variances 
(columns 1-5) of the PPI and COLI inflation rates, the deviations of output and durables-
stock from their steady-state levels and the nominal interest rates under the optimal 
policy and various alternative rules.  The welfare losses are measured by 
 0 0
0
[ ] (1 ) t t
t
E L E Lβ β∞
=
= − ∑  (2.52) 
where tL  is the period-loss function defined in (2.45). 
The first row shows the performance of the optimal monetary policy given by 
(2.50). The optimal rule minimizes the unconditional variance of nominal interest rate as 
well as the welfare loss.  
The second and third rows in table 2 show the performance of targeting rules to 
stabilize PPI inflation and the output gap, respectively. It is evident that the inflation 
targeting rule approximates closely to the optimal rule while the rule stabilizing output 
gap results in poor outcomes. This is opposite from the results in Erceg and Levin (2006) 
in which prices are sticky by the assumption of fixed-duration (Taylor-type) contracts. 
As Erceg and Levin insist, the weights on relative price and wage dispersion are much  
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smaller under fixed-duration contracts than in random-duration (Calvo-type) contracts. 
Hence, the bad performance of the aggregate inflation targeting rule in Erceg and Levin 
may be explained by the relatively low weight on variability of the output gap in the 
welfare function, not by the introduction of durable goods. 
Also the table 2 implies the central bank should target to stabilize the PPI 
inflation rates rather than the COLI inflation rates. First of all, it often happens that the 
COLI inflation targeting rule makes the model unstable. Hence, a policy to stabilize 
COLI inflation may add additional instability to the economy. Second, the fourth and the 
fifth rows show that instrument rules responding the PPI inflation rates (row 4) and the 
COLI inflation rates (row 5), respectively, have similar performance. Despite these 
results, the central bank may want to target PPI inflation because the COLI cannot be 
computed accurately due to uncertainty regarding the depreciation rate for durable 
goods.11  
                                                          
11  Orphanides (1998) insists that it results in poor performance to determine the stance of 
monetary policy based on the variables that the central bank cannot measure with certainty. 
Table 2 
Results on loss and unconditional variances with alternative rules in the baseline model 
 VπA VπC Vy Vk Vr E0 [L] 
Optimal Rule  0.0023 0.0173 2.1100 1.8873 0.0139 0.0139 
Inflation Targeting 0.0000 0.0163 3.6444 2.8003 0.0175 0.0188 
Output Gap Targeting 0.5741 0.5742 0.0090 0.0069 0.4651 0.5451 
Taylor Rule w/πA 0.4906 0.4996 0.6334 0.4981 0.4357 0.4692 
Taylor Rule w/πC 0.4879 0.5526 0.9740 0.5635 0.4412 0.4675 
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CHAPTER III 
DURABLE GOODS, PRICE INDEXES,  
AND MONETARY POLICY 
 
Since the consumption of durable goods responds sensitively to monetary policy 
shocks, it is often observed that tight (loose) monetary policy in boom (recession) causes 
severe decrease (increase) in demand for consumer durables. However, one-sector price-
sticky models, which are prevalent in monetary policy analysis, have a limited ability to 
deal with durable goods or to take account of the fact that the effects of monetary policy 
on real variables depend on the durability of consumption goods. 
This chapter examines implications of consumption goods with different 
durability for the social welfare maximizing optimal monetary policy. In section 1, it 
formulates a two-sector general equilibrium model. In the model economy, households 
obtain utility provided by two types of consumer durables. To introduce the effects of 
monetary policy on real variables, I assume price-stickiness as in Calvo (1983). 
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Section 2 explains the equilibrium of the model. In the economy with durable 
goods, the COLI and the PPI are naturally distinguished. 12  The COLI/PPI ratio is 
proportional to the real interest rate measured by the acquisitions approach, which plays 
an important role in the equilibrium dynamics by affecting the real marginal cost. 
In section 3, it defines the social welfare by taking a second-order approximation 
to the discounted sum of utilities. Also it shows that an optimal policy stabilization of 
each sector cannot be implemented because of insufficient policy instruments and that 
the second best is to stabilize a properly weighted average of the sectoral inflation rates 
as in Benigno (2004).   
Finally, section 4 evaluates the performance of a set of targeting rules and 
instrument rules. Also looks for an optimal weight of the durables sector in the economy 
with both durable and non-durable goods. Results show that the central bank should 
target to stabilize PPI inflation instead of COLI inflation by focusing more on the 
durables sector. 
 
                                                          
12 Huang and Liu (2005) distinguish the COLI and the PPI by assuming final consumption goods 
are produced through two stages of processing.   
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1. A TWO-SECTOR MODEL 
 
In this economy, there are a large number of identical and infinitely lived 
households. The representative household derives utility from services provided by two 
durable goods while he obtains disutility from supplying labors to firms producing 
intermediate goods. The production of intermediate goods requires labor as the only 
input. The final durable goods are a composite of differentiated intermediate goods.  
 
1.1. Representative Household 
The representative household seeks to maximize a discounted sum of utilities of 
the form 
 
1
0 0
0
( ) ( ( ))t t t
t
E u K v H i diβ∞
=
⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∫  (3.1) 
Here E is the expectation operator, 0 1β< <  is the discount factor, ( )tH i  is the quantity 
of labor of type i supplied to intermediate firm i in period t, and the index tK  is a Cobb-
Douglas aggregator   
 ( ) ( )1 2
1 2 1, 2,
1 2
1
t t tK K K
α α
α αα α≡  (3.2) 
where 1 2 1α α+ = , and ,j tK  for {1, 2}j =  is the stock of the final durable good produced 
in sector j which evolves according to the following law of accumulation  
 , , 1 ,(1 )j t j j t j tK K Dδ −= − +  (3.3) 
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for {1, 2}j = , where ,j tD  is the amount purchased of the final durables produced in 
sector j, and 0 1jδ≤ <  is the depreciation rate of the final durable good in sector j. 
The budget constraint of the representative household in period t is  
 
1 1
1 1 1, 1, 2, 2,0 0
( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t t t t t t tB R B W i H i di i di P D P D T− −≤ + + Π − − −∫ ∫  (3.4) 
Here tB  is the nominal value of bonds, tR  is the nominal interest rate paid on a riskless 
bond held at the end of period t, ,j tP  is the price of the final durable good in sector j, 
( )tH i  is the quantity of labor of type i  supplied to intermediate good producer i , ( )tW i  
is the nominal wage of labor of type i ,  ( )t iΠ  is the nominal profit from sales of 
intermediate good i , and tT  represents nominal net lump-sum tax collections by the 
government.  
Combining with (3.3), the budget constraint (3.4) can be rewritten as 
 
2 1 1
1 1 , , , 1 0 0
1
( (1 ) ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t j t j t j j t t t t t
j
B R B P K K W i H i di i di Tδ− − −
=
≤ − − − + + Π −∑ ∫ ∫  (3.5) 
Solving the household’s utility maximization problem gives the Euler equation, 
the relative demand equation, and the labor supply equation:  
 
1 1
( )
( )
k t t
t t
k t t
u K QR E
u K Q
β
+ +
=  (3.6)
 2, 1,1 ,
2 1, 2,
t t
R t
t t
K Q
Q
K Q
α
α
⎛ ⎞= ≡⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.7) 
 ( ( )) ( )
( )
h t t
k t t
v H i W i
u K Q
=  (3.8) 
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for [0,1]i∈ , where ku  is the marginal utility of a composite of two final durables stocks, 
hv  is the marginal disutility of working, and the user cost of durable good consumption 
in sector j ,j tQ  is defined as 
 , , , 1(1 ) /j t j t t j j t tQ P E P Rδ +⎡ ⎤≡ − −⎣ ⎦  (3.9) 
The cost of living index (COLI) tQ  is defined as
13  
 1 21, 2,t t tQ Q Q
α α≡  (3.10) 
According to Cobb-Douglas preferences, the demand functions for the stocks of 
the two durables are given by 
 , ,( / )j t j t j t tK Q Q Kα=  (3.11) 
 
1.2.  Firms and Price Setting 
1.2.1. Final Good Producers 
I assume that final durables producers behave competitively. The technology for 
producing the final goods in sector j from intermediate goods is given by   
 ( ) 11 1, 1/ ( )
j
j t j tN
Y n Y i di
θ
θ θ
θθ
− −⎡ ⎤≡ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  (3.12) 
for {1,2}j = , where the intervals of differentiated goods belong to the two sectors are, 
respectively, 1 1[0, ]N n≡  and 2 1( ,1]N n≡ , and θ>1 is the elasticity of substitution across 
                                                          
13 tQ  is also called the CPI measured by the user cost approach in price index theory. 
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goods produced within a sector. In the aggregator (3.12), jn  is the relative size of each 
sector and satisfies the identity 1 2 1n n+ = . 
Solving the firm’s profit-maximization problem yields demand functions for the 
typical intermediate good i in sector j: 
 ( ), ,1( ) ( ) /t t j t j t
j
Y i P i P Y
n
θ−=  (3.13) 
The sectoral price index consistent with the final good producer in each sector 
earning zero profits respectively, is given by 
 
1
1
1
,
1 ( )
j
j t tN
j
P P i di
n
θθ −−⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  (3.14) 
The producer price index (PPI) is defined as14 
 1 21, 2,
n n
t t tP P P≡  (3.15) 
1.2.2. Intermediate Good Producers 
Intermediate goods producers behave as monopolistic competitors. Each of the 
differentiated intermediate goods uses a specialized labor input in its production. The 
technology for producing intermediate goods type ji N∈  is 
 ,( ) ( )t j t tY i A H i=  (3.16) 
Here I assume a time-varying exogenous technology factor ,j tA  is identical across 
suppliers within sector j. 
The total cost of supplying a quantity ( )tY i  of good i  in sector j is given by 
                                                          
14 It is identical to the CPI measured by the acquisitions approach.  
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 ,( ) ( ) /t t j tW i Y i A  (3.17) 
Differentiating this with respect to ( )tY i  and combining (3.8) yields the nominal 
marginal cost of supplying good i  in sector j given by  
 ,,
,
( ( ) / )
( )
( )
h t j t t
j t
k t j t
v Y i A QNMC i
u K A
=  (3.18) 
The real marginal cost of providing good i in sector j is defined as 
 , ,,
( ) ( ( ) / )
( )
( )
j t h t j t t
j t
t k t t t
NMC i v Y i A QMC i
P u K A P
≡ =  (3.19) 
for ji N∈ . Since the COLI/PPI ratio affects the excess demand in labor markets, the real 
marginal cost in sector j is an increasing function of the COLI/PPI ratio which depends 
positively on real interest rates measure by the acquisitions approach. 
To introduce real effects of monetary policy to the model, I assume prices of the 
intermediate goods are sticky as in Calvo (1983). Each supplier in sector j can choose its 
new price with the probability 0 1 1jγ< − <  in a given period, while it keeps its old price 
fixed with the probability jγ .  
Given the price index and the demand function, a monopolistically competitive 
supplier i in sector j that changes its price in period t chooses its new price ( )tP i  to 
maximize the expected present value of its profit 
 , , , , ,
0
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )kt j t t k j t t t k j t t k t t k
k
E P i Y i MC i Y iγ λ τ∞ + + + +
=
⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦∑  (3.20) 
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where , ( ( ) / ) /( ( ) / )
k
t t k k t k t k k t tu K Q u K Qλ β+ + += , jτ  is a subsidy to intermediate good 
producers in sector j, ( )1, , , ,( ) ( ) /j t t k j t j t k j t kY i n P i P Yθ−−+ + += for ji N∈ , and 
, , ,
, ,
,
( ( ) / )
( )
( )
h j t t k j t k t k
j t t k
k t k j t k
v Y i A QNMC i
u K A
+ + +
+
+ +
=  for ji N∈ .  
The optimal choice of *,j tP  satisfies the first order condition given by  
 * * *, , , , , ,
0
(1 ) 0kt j t t k j j t j t t k j t t k
k
E P MC Yγ λ τ μ∞ + + +
=
⎡ ⎤+ − =⎣ ⎦∑  (3.21) 
where / ( 1)μ θ θ≡ −  denotes the markup, 
*
, , ,*
, ,
,
( / )
( )
h j t t k j t k t k
j t t k
k t k j t k
v Y A QMC
u K A
+ + +
+
+ +
= , and 
( )* 1 *, , , , ,/j t t k j j t j t k j t kY n P P Yθ−−+ + += . 
Note that if prices are flexible, i.e., 0jγ = , a intermediate firm sets its price equal 
to a markup proportional to its nominal marginal cost: 
 , ,1j t j tj
P MCμτ= +  (3.22) 
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As a fraction jγ  of prices are fixed, the price index in sector j evolves according 
to   
 
1
* 1 1 1
, , , 1(1 )j t j j t j j tP P P
θ θ θγ γ− − −−⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦  (3.23) 
Combining and log-linearizing to equations (3.21) and (3.23) yields the supply 
equation in sector j. 
 
1.3. Fiscal and Monetary Policy  
The government chooses subsidy rates jτ  that maximize the utility of the 
domestic household in a zero inflation steady state while the central bank determines the 
short-term nominal interest rate by a time-invariant commitment rule. The monetary 
authority (the government and the central bank) supplies bonds in amounts enough to 
meet bond demand at the target nominal-interest rate. The budget constraint of the 
monetary authority in period t is given by 
 1
2
1
1 1 1 20
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
n
t t t t t t t tn
B R B T P i Y i di P i Y i diτ τ− −− + = +∫ ∫  (3.24) 
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2. EQUILIBRIUM 
For a variable tX , I define log tt
Xx
X
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, log
n
t
t
Xx
X
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, and  ˆ log tt n
t
Xx
X
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, 
where X  and ntX  denote its steady state value and natural level, respectively. 
 
2.1. Steady-State Equilibrium 
If there is no shock, the model has a unique stationary equilibrium (with no 
inflation) described by 
 1Rβ =  (3.25) 
 1 1 2
2 2 1
R Q KQ
Q K
α
α≡ =  (3.26) 
 ( ) ( )1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
1K K K
α α
α αα α≡  (3.27) 
 j j jK Dδ =  (3.28) 
 
( ( ) / ) 1 1(1 )
( )
j
h j
j
k j j
v Y i A
u K A q
= −Φ  (3.29) 
 j jY D=  (3.30) 
 ( )j jn Y i Y= , for all ji N∈  (3.31) 
 ( ) ( ) / jH i Y i A= , for all ji N∈  (3.32) 
 0B =  (3.33) 
 1 2 2 1/ /P P A A=  (3.34) 
where / 1 (1 )j j j jq Q P β δ≡ = − − , and 1 (1 ) /j jτ μ−Φ ≡ + . Combining with zero 
inflation, the Euler and the relative demand equations yield (3.25) and (3.26). From the 
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definition of the Cobb-Douglas index and the law of accumulation, one has (3.27) and 
(3.28). The price setting equation under the flexible price regime (3.22) gives (3.29). 
From market clearing conditions, I have (3.30)-(3.33). When 1 2τ τ τ= = , equation (3.34) 
holds. 
Combining (3.28), (3.26), and 1 1 2 2 1 2( ) / ( ) /PY PY n n= , one has 
 1 2 1 1 1 1 2
2 1 2 2 2
 iff q n n
q n n
α δ δ δα δ= > <  (3.35) 
Suppose that the sector 1 produces durable goods while the sector 2 yields non-durable 
goods, i.e., 1 20 1δ δ< < = . Then ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1( ) / ( ) ( ) / ( )Q K QK n PY PKα = > =  holds by 
(3.35), that is, the relative importance of the durables sector (sector 1) in the CPI (by the 
user cost approach) 1α  is always greater than in the PPI (or the CPI by the acquisitions 
approach) 1n  as Diewart (2003) insists. 
 
2.2. Log-linearized System 
2.2.1. Real Interest Rates and Relative Prices 
In the model with durable goods, real interest rates change across economic 
agents and commodities and over time. From the definitions of price indexes and real 
interest rates, log-linear approximations of the real interest rates and of the relative 
prices are given by  
 , , 1
A A
j t t t j trr r E π +≡ − ,  (3.36) 
 1 1 1, 2 2,
A A A A
t t t t t trr r E n rr n rrπ +≡ − = + ,  (3.37) 
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 ( ), , 1 , , 11 (1 )C C A Aj t t t j t j t j t j t
j
rr r E rr q E rr
q
π + +≡ − = − −  (3.38) 
 1 1 1, 2 2,
C C C C
t t t t t trr r E rr rrπ α α+≡ − = +  (3.39) 
 1 21 2 1, 2,
1 2
1 1log( / )R A A Rt t t t
q qq Q Q rr rr p
q q
− −≡ = − +  (3.40) 
 1 2 1 1, 2,log( / )
R R A A
t t t t tp P P E p rr rr+≡ = + −  (3.41) 
for j = 1,2, where the PPI and COLI inflation rates in sector j are defined, respectively, 
as , , , 1log( / )
A
j t j t j tP Pπ −≡  and , , , 1log( / )Cj t j t j tQ Qπ −≡ . The PPI and COLI inflation in the 
economy are defined as 1 1, 2 2,
A A A
t t tn nπ π π= +  and 1 1, 2 2,C C Ct t tπ α π α π= + , respectively. In 
(3.36) and (3.38), ,
A
j trr  and ,
C
j trr  are the real interest rates in sector j measured by the 
acquisitions and the user cost approaches, respectively. In (3.37) and (3.39), Atrr  and 
C
trr  are the real interest rates in the economy measured by the acquisitions and the user 
cost approaches, respectively. In (3.40) and (3.41), Rtq and
R
tp  are the relative prices in 
the COLI and the PPI, respectively.  
 
2.2.2. Flexible-Price Equilibrium 
When prices are fully flexible, monetary policy is neutral, and thus real variables 
are affected only by real disturbances (called productivity shocks in this paper). In 
flexible-price equilibrium, quantities and prices of differentiated goods are identical 
within sector j:  
 ,( )j t j tn Y i Y= , and ,( )t j tP i P=  
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Combining the price setting equation (3.22), market-clearing conditions, and the 
Euler equation, one gets the log-linearized equilibrium in the case of flexible prices as a 
linear function of the current and past productivity shocks. 
 1 , , ,(1 ) 0t j t t j t j tk y q p aσ ω ω− + + − − + =  (3.42) 
 1
C
t t t tk E k rrσ+= −  (3.43) 
 2, 1,
R
t t tk k q− =  (3.44) 
 1 1, 2 2,t t tk k kα α= +  (3.45) 
 ( ), , , 11 (1 )j t j t j t
j
y k kδδ −= − −  (3.46) 
Here / ( ) 0k kku Kuσ ≡ − >  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of aggregates of 
durable good stocks , / 0yy yYv vω ≡ >  represents the elasticity of the marginal disutility 
of work, and  
 
1
1, 2
1
,
1
1, 1
1
1 when   1
1 when   2
A R
t t
t j t
A R
t t
q rr q j
q
q p
q rr q j
q
α
α
−⎧ − =⎪⎪− = ⎨ −⎪ + =⎪⎩
. 
From the definition of Ctrr  and equations (3.44)-(3.46), the Euler equation (3.43) 
can be rewritten as 
 ( ) ( ), , 1 3 1 , , 1( / ) (1 )R R A Aj t t j t j t t t j t j t j t j tk E k q E q q E rr q E rrη σ+ + +− = − − − −  (3.47) 
where 
 
1
2 1
3 1
1 2
(1 ) when   1
(1 ) when   2j
q j
q j
α ση α σ
−
−
⎧ − == ⎨ − − =⎩
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Using (3.46) to eliminate ,j ty  in (3.42), one obtains 
 1 , , , 3 ,
1
( / ) (1 )( / ) (1 )j A Rj j t j j j t j t j t j t
j
q
k k rr q a
q
σ ω δ δ ω δ η ω− −+ − − + = + +  (3.48) 
Using (3.48) to substitute for the interest rate terms in (3.47), one gets 
 ( )1 , 2 , 1 , 1 3 , , 1(1 )( (1 ) )Rj j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j tk E k k q a q E aη η β η ω+ − +− + = − + − −  (3.49) 
where 11 (1 (1 )(1 )( / ))j j j j jq qη σ δ ω δ−= + + − − , 2 (1 )( / )j j jη δ ω δ= −  for {1,2}j∈ , and 
Finally ,j tk  and 
R
tq  under the flexible-price regime are determined From (3.44) 
and (3.49). 
 
2.2.3. Sticky-Price Equilibrium 
In this section, I discuss the log-linear approximation of the equilibrium under 
the sticky-price regime. The sticky-price equilibrium can be represented by the 
linearization system which consists of two brocks: the demand and the supply blocks. 
First, I begin to explain the demand block. Log-linear approximations of the 
Euler equation, the relative demand equation, the definition of the durables-stock index, 
and the law of accumulation, respectively, are given by 
 1
C
t t t tk E k rrσ+= −  (3.50) 
 2, 1,
R
t t tk k q− =  (3.51) 
 1 1, 2 2,t t tk k kα α= +  (3.52) 
 ( ), , , , 11 (1 )j t j t j t j t
j
y d k kδδ −= = − −  (3.53) 
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Log-linearizing to (3.21) and (3.23) yields the supply equation in sector j 
(derived in appendix B) given by  
 ( )1, , 1 , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆA Aj t t j t j t j t t j tE k y q pπ β π ϕ σ ω−+= + + + −  (3.54) 
for j=1,2,  where 
(1 )(1 )
(1 )
j j
j
j
γ γ βϕ γ ωθ
− −= + , and 
?
?
1
1, 2
1
,
2
2, 1
2
1 ˆ  when   1
ˆ ˆ
1 ˆ  when   2
A R
t t
t j t A R
t t
q rr q j
q
q p
q rr q j
q
α
α
−⎧ − =⎪⎪− = ⎨ −⎪ + =⎪⎩
. 
Comparing to a standard two-sector model, the supply equation (3.54) has several 
distinct characteristics. First, the current inflation rate in sector j depends positively on 
both the past and the present output gaps because the household utility is a function of 
the durables-stock index. Second, in sector j, the real interest rates have positive effect 
on the PPI inflation by changing the COLI/PPI ratio. Finally, the inflation rates in sector 
j depend also on the relative user cost Rtq . Under the assumption of perishable goods, i.e., 
1jδ =  for j=1,2, (3.54) reduces to the supply equation as in Aoki (2001) and Benigno 
(2004) where two sectors produce only non-durable goods. 
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It is easy to show that the system collapses into IS curves and supply equations 
that determine ,ˆ j tk  and ,
A
j tπ  conditional on the path of nominal interest rates tr : 
 ( ) ? ?( ), , 1, , 1 3 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( / ) (1 )A AR R j t j tj t t j t j t t t j t jk E k q E q q E rr q rrη σ ++ += + − − − −  (3.55) 
 ?
1
, , 1
, , 1
, 3
ˆ ˆ( ( / )) (1 )( / )
1
ˆ
j j t j j j t
A A
Aj t t j t j j R
j t j t
j
k k
E q
rr q
q
σ ω δ δ ω δ
π β π ϕ η
−
−
+
⎛ ⎞+ − −⎜ ⎟= + −⎜ ⎟+ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.56) 
where 3, jη  is defined in (3.47). 
Using (3.56) to substitute for real interest rate terms in (3.55), the supply 
equations can be rewritten equivalently in the form 
 
( ) ( ), , 1 , 1 , 2 3 1
, , 1 , 1 ,
ˆ ˆ(1 )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
j
A A A A R R
j t t j t j t j t t j t j t t t
S
k j t j j t j j t j j t
E q E E q E q
k k k k
π β π π β π η
χ υ βυ υ
+ + + +
− +
= + − − − −
⎡ ⎤+ − − −⎣ ⎦
 (3.57) 
where 2, /j
S
k j j jχ ϕ η υ≡ , and jυ  and 2, jη  is defined in (3.49), and 0 1j jυ δ< < −  is the 
smaller root of the quadratic equation    
 21 2 ( 1)j j j jη υ η βυ= +  
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3. OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY  
 
3.1. The Objective of Monetary Policy 
In this section, I look for an optimal commitment policy rule which maximizes 
the representative household’s expected life time utility given by 
 0 0 0W U V≡ −  (3.58) 
where 0 0
0
( )t t
t
U E u Kβ∞
=
≡ ∑ , and 10 0 0
0
( ( ))t t
t
V E v H i diβ∞
=
≡ ∑ ∫ . 
Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), I take a second-order Taylor 
approximation of the welfare function (3.58) around the steady state values with zero 
inflation.  Then an approximation of the discounted sum of utility takes the form 
(derived in appendix B)   
 ( )30
0
1 . .
2
t
k t
t
W Ku L t i p O aβ∞
=
= − + +∑  (3.59) 
Here the term t.i.p. denotes terms that are independent of monetary policy, ( )3O a  
denotes the terms that are of third or higher order in the deviations of the various 
variables from their steady-state values, and the period-loss function is given by 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 211 1 , , 1 , 1 2
11 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )
j j
L L A R
t j k j t j j t j t t
j
L n k k q
q n π
α δ χ υ χ π α α σ −−
=
⎡ ⎤= − + + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑  (3.60) 
where 2 / ( ) (1 )( / ) / ( )j
L
k j j j j j j jχ η δ υ δ ω δ δ υ= = − , and /jL jπχ θ ϕ= . The period-loss 
function has several distinct characteristics. First of all, 
j
L
kχ  is an decreasing function of 
jδ , which means that the central bank should put more weight on the sector producing 
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more durable goods. Second, /
j
L
jπχ θ ϕ=  is an increasing function of jγ , which implies 
the central bank should focus more on the sector where prices are stickier, as Aoki 
(2001) and Benigno (2004) argue. Finally, comparing to a standard model, , , 1ˆ ˆj t j tk kυ −−  
takes the place of the output gap in the period-loss function. Taking into account that 
0 1j jυ δ< < − , it implies that once the durables-stock deviates from its natural level, it 
should be adjusted gradually to its natural level. Hence, targeting rules that require 
keeping the output and/or the durables stock at their natural levels may yield bad 
outcomes in terms of social welfare, since such rules do not allow the durables stock to 
be adjusted gradually when the durables stock gap is not equal to zero. 
 
3.2. Optimal Monetary Policy 
An optimal monetary policy seeks to minimize the discounted sum of losses 
(3.60) subject to the sticky-price equilibrium. The Lagrangian for this problem is given 
by 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
2 22
, , 1 ,
1
21
1 2
0 , , 1 , 1 , 2
2
, 3 1
1
, , 1 , 1 ,
ˆ ˆ
(1 )
(1 )
ˆ ˆ2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
j
j j j A
j t j j t j t
j j j j j
R R
t t
t A A A A
j t t j t j t j t t j t
R R
j t j t t t
j
S
k j t j j t j j t j j t
k k
q
q q
E E q E E
q E q
k k k k
α δ η θυ πδ υ ϕ
α α σ
β π β π π β π
φ η
χ υ βυ υ
−
=
−
+ + +
+
=
− +
⎡ ⎤− +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
+ − −
⎡ − − − −⎢⎢+ + −⎢⎢ ⎡ ⎤− − − −⎢ ⎣ ⎦⎣
∑
∑0t
∞
=
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎤⎨ ⎬⎥⎪ ⎪⎥⎪ ⎪⎥⎪ ⎪⎥⎪ ⎪⎥⎦⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑  (3.61) 
The first-order necessary conditions with respect to ,ˆ j tk  and ,
A
j tπ   are given by 
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( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 21
1, 1 1, 1 1 1, 1 1 1,
1 1
1 1 1
1 2 2 1 1, 1, 1
1, 1 1, 1 1 1, 1 1 1,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ(1 ) (1 )
( ) 0
j
t t t t
R
t t t
S
k t t t t
k k k k
q
q q
α η υ βυ υυ
α α σ α σ φ β φ
χ φ υ φ βυ φ υ φ
− +
− − −
−
− +
⎡ ⎤− − −⎣ ⎦
− − − − −
⎡ ⎤− − − − =⎣ ⎦
 (3.62) 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
2 22
2, 2 2, 1 2 2, 1 2 2,
2 2
1 1 1
1 2 1 2 2, 2, 1
2, 2 2, 1 2 2, 1 2 2,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ(1 ) (1 )
( ) 0
j
t t t t
R
t t t
S
k t t t t
k k k k
q
q q
α η υ βυ υυ
α α σ α σ φ β φ
χ φ υ φ βυ φ υ φ
− +
− − −
−
− +
⎡ ⎤− − −⎣ ⎦
+ − − − −
⎡ ⎤− − − − =⎣ ⎦
 (3.63) 
 , , , 1 , 2(2 ) (1 ) 0
j j A
j t j t j t j t
j jq
α δ θ π φ δ φ δ φϕ − −+ − − + − = , for j=1,2. (3.64) 
For simplicity, I assume the utility is a logarithm function ( 1σ = ) which is 
separable in terms of each good. Then combining (3.62), (3.63) and (3.64) yields  
 , , 1 , , 1
1 ˆ ˆ( ) (1 )( ) 0A Aj t j j t j t j j tL y yπ υ π υθ− −− + − − =  (3.65) 
for j = 1,2, for each 0t ≥ .  
The optimal policy in the economy is to have (3.65) hold in each sector. 
However, the optimal policy is not feasible. As Benigno (2004) notes, the central bank 
has only one policy instrument, so it cannot cope with distortions in both sectors. In the 
next section, I investigate the performance of a set of targeting rules and instrument rules 
in order to find whether it is optimal to give higher weight to the sector producing more 
durable goods.  
 48
4. NUMERICAL RESULTS 
 
In this section, I compare the performance of several targeting rules and 
instrument rules. In section 4.1, I begin with the calibration of the structural parameters 
and the shock processes in the model used for numerical analysis. Section 4.2 then 
explains the results of numerical analysis. I use the AIM algorithm to solve rational 
expectation models in this section.  
 
4.1. Calibration 
The calibrated values are summarized in Table 3. Based on the empirical results 
of Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), and Erceg and Levin (2006), I calibrate structural 
parameters and the shock processes of the model to simulate data at a quarterly 
frequency.  
The discount factor β is set to the conventional value of 0.99 which implies the 
annual real interest rate is 4%. I set γ =0.66, so an average lifetime of price contracts is 
three quarters. An average markup in goods markets is 15%. Thus θ is set to 7.88.  
 
 
Table 3 
Calibrated parameter values in the two-sector model 
β 0.99  n1 0.125  ρa1 0.900 
γ 0.66  α1 0.166  sd(a1) 0.036 
θ 7.88  δ1 0.025  ρa2 0.900 
σ 1.00  δ2 1.000  sd(a2) 0.036 
ω 0.60       
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Following Amato and Laubach (2001), I set ω=0.60 which is consistent with a Frisch 
elasticity of 5 and a Cobb-Douglas production technology with a coefficient on labor of 
0.75. I assume the period utility is a log function, so σ is set to 1. Following Erceg and 
Levin (2006), the depreciation rates, δ1 and δ2, are set to 0.025 and 1, respectively, which 
means that the annual depreciation rate of the final good in sector 1 is 10% and that the 
final good in sector 2 is non-durable. Finally, technology shocks in sector 1 and 2 are 
assumed to independently follow AR(1) processes with the coefficients (ρa1 and ρa1) of 
0.90 and the conditional standard deviations (sd(a1) and sd(a2)) of 0.036. 
 
4.2. Results 
This section compares outcomes of a set of instrument rules (rows 1-3) and 
targeting rules (rows 4-8) in terms of the welfare loss given by  
 0 0
0
[ ] (1 ) t t
t
E L E Lβ β∞
=
= − ∑  (3.66) 
where tL  is the period-loss function defined in (3.60). Table 4 reports welfare losses (the 
last column) and unconditional variances (columns 4-7) of the sectoral inflation rates 
and output, and the nominal interest rates under various targeting rules and instrument 
rules.  
The rows 1-3 in table 4 show outcomes of three targeting rules.15 The first row is 
the performance of the optimal inflation targeting rule ( 1, 2,(1 ) 0
A A
t tn nπ π+ − = ) with the 
weight on the durables sector n chosen optimally. The second row indicates the results of  
                                                          
15 Svensson (1999) distinguishes targeting rules from instrument rules. 
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Table 4 
Results on loss and unconditional variances with alternative rules in the two-sector modela 
 κ1 κ2 nb Vπ1 Vπ2 Vy1 Vy2 Vr E0 [L]
Targeting Rules          
  Optimal index   0.38 0.040 0.015 40.7 3.438 0.017 0.003 
  Inflation    0.145 0.003 144 4.787 0.040 0.006 
  Stock gap    1.132 0.633 1607 4.276 0.992 0.103 
Instrument Rulesc         
  Inflation (z=A) >100 0.0 0.41 0.031 0.014   42.6 3.502 0.015 0.003 
  Inflation (z=C) 1.5 0.0 0.15 0.379 0.099 1097 3.999 0.228 0.043 
  Stock gap 0.0 >100 0.15 0.057 0.023 52.1 3.881 0.022 0.004 
  Taylor Rule (z=A) 0.5 1.5  0.075 0.013 91.5 3.883 0.031 0.005 
  Taylor Rule (z=C) 0.5 1.5  0.077 0.013 91.3 3.929 0.033 0.005 
aThe welfare loss and unconditional variances are multiplied by 103. 
bn is the relative weight on the durables sector chosen optimally. 
cInstrument rules have the form ( ) ( )1 1, 2, 2 1, 2,(1 ) (1 )z zt t t t tr n n ny n yκ π π κ= + − + + − , for { , }z A C∈  . 
 
 
the PPI inflation targeting rule ( 0Atπ = ). Since the PPI inflation targeting is nested in the 
optimal inflation targeting, it is natural that the latter is better than the former in terms of 
the social welfare. The third row shows that the durables-stock gap targeting ( ˆ 0k = ) is 
the worst rule among a set of rules under consideration.   
The table 4 also considers three types of instrument rules. First, the rows 4-5 
show outcomes of instrument rules responding only to an optimally weighted average of 
sectoral inflation rates. The results indicate that central banks can considerably reduce 
the welfare loss by giving more weight on the durables sector and by adjusting its policy 
rate responding to the PPI inflation rates instead of the COLI inflation rates. The sixth 
row shows it yields bad outcomes to adjust the interest rate by the instrument rule 
depending only on the present durables-stock gap ( 1, 2,(1 ) 0t tnk n k+ − = ), even if 
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coefficients, n and 2κ , are selected optimally. Finally, the seventh and eighth rows show 
the performance of Taylor rules responding to the current inflation rate and output gap 
with coefficients ( 1κ  and 2κ ) 1.5 and 0.5, respectively. The inflation rates in the seventh 
and eighth rows are defined as the PPI and the COLI inflation rates, respectively. The 
results show that the Taylor rule responding to PPI inflation is slightly better and that the 
performance of instrument rules can be improved by adding the inflation rates terms. 
To summarize the results in table 4, first of all, it is optimal to target core 
inflation giving more weight to the sector producing more durable goods. As shown in 
the third column, the relative weight of the durables sector n chosen optimally is greater 
than 12.5%. The result provides justification for a policy targeting core inflation rather 
than aggregate inflation as in Aoki (2001), and offers another criterion for the 
construction of such an index, while Aoki suggests to measure core inflation base on 
relative price stickiness. 
Second, it is evident that the inflation-targeting rule overwhelms the durables-
stock gap targeting rule, which is an opposite result to Erceg and Levin (2006). Their 
results may be explained by the low (relative) weight on inflation variability in the 
period-loss function, not by the introduction of durable goods. 
Finally, the table 2 implies the central bank should target to stabilize the PPI 
inflation rather than the COLI inflation. It often happens that the COLI inflation 
targeting rule makes the model unstable, which implies monetary policy to stabilize the 
COLI inflation targeting may add additional instability to the economy. In addition, the 
instrument rules responding PPI inflation show better performance. Finally, note that in 
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practice determining the stance of monetary policy mechanically by rules responding to 
the COLI inflation rates may lead to worse outcomes because it is difficult to measure 
COLI inflation accurately. According to Orphanides (1998), implementing monetary 
policy based on variables that the central bank cannot measure with certainty may well 
result in poor performance. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation studied the relationship among durable goods, price indexes and 
monetary policy in two sticky-price models. One is a one-sector model with only durable 
goods and the other is a two-sector model with both durable and non-durable goods.  
The general equilibrium models with the durables have several characteristics. 
First, the COLI and the PPI (the CPI measured by the acquisitions approach) are 
distinguished in the model. The COLI consists of the user costs of durable goods which 
depend on positively on the real interest rate measured by the acquisitions approach 
while the PPI is made of prices purchasing durable goods. By the result, the supply 
equation depends positively on the COLI/PPI ratio proportional to the real interest rate, 
which explains why consumption of durable goods responds more sensitively to 
monetary policy shocks. 
Second, the social welfare can be represented by a quadratic function of the 
quasi-differenced durables-stock gaps and the PPI inflation rates. It means that once the 
durables-stock deviates from its natural level, it should be recovered toward the natural 
level gradually. Hence, a policy stabilizing strictly the output gap or the durables-stock 
gap may not be optimal.  
Third, even if the introduction of durable goods changes the dynamics of log-
linear equilibrium and the form of the social welfare function, the optimal policy in the 
one-sector model is to keep the (acquisition) price and the output gap at a constant rate. 
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The rate does not depend on the durability of the good. Without cost-push shocks, a 
policy completely stabilizing inflation is also optimal. 
Fourth, in the two-sector model with durable and non-durable goods, the relative 
importance of the durables sector to the non-durables sector in the social welfare 
depends positively on the durability of the durable goods. In addition, the central bank 
cannot stabilize the inflation rates of both sectors since it has only one policy instrument. 
Hence, a policy stabilizing a properly weighted average of the sectoral inflation rates 
giving more weight on the durables sector is optimal. This conclusion is consistent with 
Aoki who insists a policy targeting core inflation rather than aggregate inflation. 
However, the dissertation offers another criterion for the construction of core inflation.  
Finally, the numerical simulations show a policy targeting core inflation 
constructed by the sectoral PPI inflation rates yields better performance than by the 
sectoral COLI inflation rates. This implies that a PPI is an adequate price index for 
monetary policy. 
In conclusion, central banks face a tradeoff between the durables sectors and the 
non-durables sectors, which could comes from the fact that demands for heterogeneous 
goods have different sensitivities to monetary policy shocks depending positively on the 
durability of the good.  It is desirable that monetary policy stabilizes core inflation 
constructed by the sectoral PPI inflation rates and by giving more weight to the sector 
producing more durable goods. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
A.1 . Derivation of the Supply Equation (2.41)  
This section derives equation (2.41) in chapter II. Combining the definitions of 
,t t kλ +  and *, ( )t t kMC i+ , equation (2.16) can be rewritten as  
 ( ) * * *, ,
0
(1 ) ( ) / ( / ) / 0kt t k t k t k h t t k t k t k t t k
k
E P u K Q v Y A A Yγβ τ μ∞ + + + + + +
=
⎡ ⎤+ − =⎣ ⎦∑  (A.1) 
Combining (2.29), log-linear approximations to equation (A.1) yields 
 ( )
*
1
1
0
1
(1 )
0
(1 ) 1ˆ ˆ ( )
k
A
t t s
sk
t
k A A
t t t t
p
E
qk k rr rr
q
ωθ π
γβ δσ ω δ ω
δ δ
+∞ =
−=
−
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞+ − +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥ =⎢ ⎥⎛ ⎞+ − −⎢ ⎥− + −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑
∑  (A.2) 
where ( )* * log /t t tp P P≡ . 
Since *tp  does not depend on k, equation (A.2) can be expressed as 
 
( )* * 1 1
1
1
1 (1 ) 1ˆ ˆ ( )
1
A
t t t t
A A
t t t t
p p E
qk k rr rr
q
γβ π
γβ δσ ω δ ω
ωθ δ δ
+ +
−
−
= +
⎛ ⎞− + − −+ − + −⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠
 (A.3) 
In addition, log-linearization of (2.18) yields  
 *
1
A
t tp
γ πγ= −  (A.4) 
Using (A.4) to substitute for *tp  in (A.3), one obtains a New Keynesian Phillips 
Curve of the form 
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1
1 1
(1 ) 1ˆ ˆ ( )A A A At t t t t t t
qE k k rr rr
q
δσ ω δ ωπ β π ϕ δ δ
−
+ −
⎛ ⎞+ − −= + − + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
where (1 )(1 )
(1 )
γ γβϕ γ ωθ
− −≡ + . 
 
A.2 . Analytical Solution to Flexible-Price Equilibrium 
In this section, I derive an analytical solution to flexible-price equilibrium given 
by equation (2.33).  
Combining (2.29) and (2.31), one gets  
 1 1
1( ) (1 ) (1 ) 0At t t t
qk k rr a
q
ω ωσ δ ωδ δ
−
−
−+ − − + − + =  (A.5) 
Using (2.32) to substitute for Ctrr  in (2.30), one gets 
 1 1( / ) (1 )
A A
t t t t t t tk E k q E rr q E rrσ+ +⎡ ⎤= − − −⎣ ⎦  (A.6) 
Updating (A.5) one period and taking expectations in period t, one obtains 
 1 1 1
1( ) (1 ) (1 ) 0At t t t t t t
qE k k E rr E a
q
ω ωσ δ ωδ δ
−
+ +
−+ − − + − + =  (A.7) 
Using (A.5) and (A.7) to substitute for interest terms in (A.6), one gets 
 ( ) ( )1 2 1 1 1(1 ) (1 ) 0t t t t t t tk E k k a q E aη η ω+ − +− + − + − − =  (A.8) 
As the solution to (A.8) has a form 1t t tk k aυ −= +  where 1(1 )t ta aω ζ −≡ + , one 
obtains 
 
( )
( ) ( )
2
1 2 1
1 2 1 1
( 1)
(1 ) 0
t
t t t t t t t
k
a a E a a q E a
ηυ η βυ
η βη υ ζ
−
+ +
− +
− + − − − =  (A.9) 
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Since the equation (A.9) holds any values of 1ˆ
n
tK −  and ta , one obtains (2.33). In 
addition, ta  follows an AR(1) process defined in (2.35), and thus 1t t tE a aρ+ = , which 
gives (2.36). 
 
A.3 . The Representative Household’s Welfare 
 
This section provides details of the derivation of equations  (2.44) and (2.45) in 
chapter II which are the second-order approximation to the representative household’s 
welfare. The second-order Taylor series approximation of the utility of consumption is 
given by 
 ( )31 21( ) (1 ) . .2t k t tu K Ku k k t i p O aσ −⎛ ⎞= + − + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . (A.10) 
Assuming 0Φ = , the second-order approximation of the disutility function is 
given by 
 ( )21 30
1
1 (1 ) (1 )
2( ( ) / ) . .
1 ( ) var ( )
2
t t t t
t t k
i t
y y a yKY i A di u t i p O a
q y i
ω ωδν
θ ω−
⎧ ⎫+ + − +⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪= + +⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪+ +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∫ , (A.11)
where vari  denotes the variance of the distribution of values for the differentiated goods.  
Combining (A.10) and (A.11) with (2.43), one gets 
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 ( )
1 2
0 0
0
2
3
0
10
1 (1 )
2
1 (1 ) (1 )
2 . .
1 ( ) var ( )
2
t
k t t
t
t t t t
t
k
t
i t
W E Ku k k
y y a yK u E t i p O a
q y i
β σ
ω ωδ β
θ ω
∞ −
=
∞
−=
⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎧ ⎫+ + − +⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪− + +⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪+ +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑
∑
. (A.12) 
Using the law of accumulation of durable goods and the market clearing 
condition t tD Y= , one gets 
 ( ) ( )21 121 1(1 ) 2t t t t ty k k k kδδδ δ− −−= − − − −  (A.13) 
Combining (A.12) and (A.13), one has 
 
( )
( ) ( )1 2 1 1 30 1
0
1
( )1
1 . .2(1 ) (1 )
2
( ) var ( )
t t t t
t
k t t t
t
i t
k k k k
KW u t i p O aa q a k
q
y i
η η β
δ δβ ω
θ ω
+ −∞
+
=
−
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤− +⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪= − + +− + − −⎢ ⎥⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪+ +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑  (A.14) 
where ( )1 21 1 (1 ) ( / )qη σ β δ ω δ−⎡ ⎤= + + −⎣ ⎦ , 2 (1 )( / )η δ ω δ= − , and 0 1υ δ< < −  is the 
smaller root of quadratic equation    
 21 2 ( 1)ηυ η βυ= +   
Note that I implicitly assume that the initial value of the stock of durables is 
equal to its steady state value and, thus, use the formula 11
0 0
t t
t t
t t
C Cβ β∞ ∞ +−
= =
=∑ ∑  for any 
variable C. 
Combining (A.8) to substitute for ta  in (A.14), the discounted welfare function 
can be rewritten as  
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( )
( ) ( )1 2 1 1 30 1 2 1 1
0
1
( )1
1 . .2 ( )
2
( ) var ( )
t t t t
t
k t t t t
t
i t
k k k k
KW u t i p O ak k k k
q
y i
η η β
δ δβ η η β
θ ω
+ −∞
+ −
= −
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤− +⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪= − + +− − +⎢ ⎥⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪+ +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑  (A.15) 
Combining (2.34) with (A.15), one obtain the form 
 
( )
( )
( )
2
1 1
20
1 10
1
3
( ) ( )
1
1
2 ( ) ( )2
( ) var ( )
. .
t t t t t
t
k
t t t t tt
i t
k k k k k
KW u k k k k kq
y i
t i p O a
η υ βυ υυδ ηδβ υ βυ υυ
θ ω
− +
∞
− +=
−
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤− − −⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪= − ⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥− − − −⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪+ +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
+ +
∑
 (A.16) 
where υ  is defined in (2.34). 
Combining (A.16) and ( )2 2
0 0
ˆvar ( )
(1 )(1 )
t t A
i t t
t t
y i γθβ β πγ γβ
∞ ∞
= =
= − −∑ ∑ , the second-
order approximation to the household’s welfare can be rewritten as16 
 
( ) ( )
( )
2 22
0 1
0
3
ˆ ˆ
. .
t A
k t t t
t
KW u k k
q
t i p O a
ηδ θ ϕβ υ πϕ θ δυ
∞
−
=
⎧ ⎫= − − +⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭
+ +
∑
  
  
 
 
                                                          
16 See Woodford (2003, Chapter 6). 
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APPENDIX B 
 
B.1. Derivation of the Supply Equation (3.54)  
This section derives equation (3.54) in chapter III. Combining the definitions of 
,t t kλ +  and *, ( )t t kMC i+ , equation (3.21) can be rewritten as  
( ) * * *, , , , , , ,
0
(1 ) ( ) / ( / ) / 0
k
t j j j t k t k t k h j t t k j t k j t k j t t k
k
E P u K Q v Y A A Yγ β τ μ∞ + + + + + +
=
⎡ ⎤+ − =⎣ ⎦∑  (B.1) 
Combining (3.42), log-linear approximations to equation (B.1) yields 
 ( ) ( )
*
, ,
1
0 1
, ,
(1 )
0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
k
A
j t j t sk
s
t
k
t k j t k t k j t k
p
E
k y q p
ωθ π
γβ
σ ω
∞ +
=
= −
+ + + +
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞+ − +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ =⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥+ + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑∑  (B.2) 
( )* *, ,where  log /j t j t tp P P≡ . 
Since *tp  does not depend on k, equation (B.2) can be expressed as 
 
( )
( )
* *
, , 1 , 1
1
, ,
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
1
A
j t j j t t j t
j
t j t t j t
p p E
k y q p
γ β π
γ β σ ωωθ
+ +
−
= +
−+ + + −+
 (B.3) 
In addition, log-linearization of (3.23) yields  
 *, ,1
j A
j t j t
j
p
γ πγ= −  (B.4) 
Using (B.4) to substitute for *,j tp  in (B.3), one obtains the supply equation in 
sector j of the form 
 ( )1, , 1 , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆj t t j t j t j t t j tE k y q pπ β π ϕ σ ω−+= + + + −  
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where 
(1 )(1 )
(1 )
j j
j
j
γ γ βϕ γ ωθ
− −= + . 
 
B.2. The Representative Household’s Welfare 
 
This section provides details of the derivation of equations  (3.59) and (3.60) in 
chapter III which are the second-order approximation to the representative household’s 
welfare. The second-order Taylor series approximation of the utility of consumption is 
given by 
 ( )31 21( ) (1 ) . .2t k t tu K Ku k k t i p O aσ −⎛ ⎞= + − + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . (B.5) 
From the definition of tk , (B.5) can be written as 
 ( ) ( )2 311, 2, 1 2 1, 2,1( ) (1 ) . .2t t t k t tu K u u Ku k k t i p O aα α σ −= + − − − + +  (B.6) 
where 1 2, , ,
1 (1 )
2j t j k j t j t
u Ku k kα σ −⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
In the case of any good i in sector j, a second-order approximation of the 
disutility of labor can be written in the form 
 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
2
,
3
,
1( ( ) / ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
( ) ( ) . . .
j j j
j j
t j t y t y y t
A y j t j t
v Y i A v v Y i Y i v Y i Y i
v A A Y i Y i t i p O a
= + − + −
+ − − + +
 (B.7) 
where / ( )
jy
v v Y i= ∂ ∂ , 2 2/ ( )
j jy y
v Y iν = ∂ ∂ , and ( )2 / ( )
j jA y j
v A Y iν = ∂ ∂ ∂  for all ji N∈ . 
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Using the formula 2( / 2)t t tX X X x x− = +  and arranging the terms that are of 
third or higher order in the deviations of the various variables from their steady-state 
values, (B.7) is rewritten in the form  
 ( )
2 2 2
,
3
,
1 1( ( ) / ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
( ) ( ) . . .
j j j
j j
t j t y t t y y t
A y j j t t
v Y i A v Y i y i y i v Y i y i
v A Y i a y i t i p O a
⎛ ⎞= + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
+ + +
 (B.8) 
Using the definition of ω  and (1 ) /
j j jA y y j
v v Aω= − + , one obtains  
 
( )
( )
2
, ,
3
1( ( ) / ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
2
. .
jt j t y t t j t t
v Y i A v Y i y i y i a y i
t i p O a
ω ω⎛ ⎞= + + − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
+ +
 (B.9) 
Integrating (B.9) over the goods i belonging to sector j, I have 
 
( )
( )
, ,
2
,
3
( ( ) / )
1( ) (1 ) ( ) var ( )
2( )
(1 ) ( )
. .
j
j j j
j
j
j t t j tN
i N t i N t i N t
j y
j t i N t
v v Y i A di
E y i E y i y i
n v Y i
a E y i
t i p O a
ω
ω
∈ ∈ ∈
∈
≡
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤+ + +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− +⎝ ⎠
+ +
∫
 (B.10) 
where 
ji N
E ∈ and var ji N∈  denote, respectively, the mean and variance of the distribution of 
values for the differentiated goods i in sector j.  
Combining ( )j jY n Y i=  and the Taylor series approximation to the CES 
production function, ( )31, 1( ) (1 ) var ( )2j jj t i N t i N ty E y i y i aθ −∈ ∈= + − + , (B.10) can be 
rewritten as 
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 ( )2, , , , 3,
1
1 (1 ) (1 )
2 . .
1 ( ) var ( )
2
j
j
j t j t j t j t
j t y j
i N t
y y a y
v v Y t i p O a
y i
ω ω
θ ω− ∈
⎛ ⎞+ + − +⎜ ⎟= + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (B.11) 
Assuming 0jΦ = , and using j j jy j k
j
v Y Ku
q
α δ= , (B.11) can be rewritten as the 
form 
 ( )2, , , , 3,
1
1 (1 ) (1 )
2 . .
1 ( ) var ( )
2 j
j t j t j t j t
j j
j t k
j
i N t
y y a y
v Ku t i p O a
q y i
ω ωα δ
θ ω− ∈
⎛ ⎞+ + − +⎜ ⎟= + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (B.12) 
 
Here ,0jW  is defined as 
 
( ) ( )
( )
3
,0 , ,
0
1 2
, ,
2
, , , ,
0
1
3
. .
1 (1 )
2
1 (1 ) (1 )
2
1 ( ) var ( )
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j j t j t
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j t j t
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j k j t j t j t j t
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W u v t i p O a
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Ku y y a y
q y i
t i p O a
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α β ω ωδ
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=
−
∞
=
−
∈
≡ − + +
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞+ −⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎛ ⎞= ⎨ ⎬+ + − +⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪− ⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟+ +⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
+ +
∑
∑  (B.13) 
Combining (B.13) and (3.49), one has 
 
( )
( )
( )
1
1 , 2 , 1 , 1 ,
1 1, 2 1, 1 1, 11
,0 ,
0 3
1
3
( )
2
2
( ) var ( )
. .
j
j j j t j j t j t j t
j t j t tj j t
j k j j tR
tj j t
i N t
k k k k
k k k
W Ku k
q q
y i
t i p O a
δ η η β
η η βα δ β δ η
θ ω
−
+ −
∞ + −−
=
−
∈
⎧ ⎫− +⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎛ ⎞− +⎪ ⎪⎜ ⎟= − −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟−⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪+ +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
+ +
∑
 (B.14) 
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where 1 jη  and 2 jη  are defined in (3.49), and 3 jη  is defined in (3.47).  
 
 
( )
( )
22 3 1
, , 1 ,
,0
0 1
3
2ˆ ˆ (1 )
2
( ) var ( )
. .
j
j j R
j t j j t t j tj j t
j j jj k
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i N t
k k q k
W Ku
q
y i
t i p O a
η ηυ σα δ δ υ δβ
θ ω
−∞ −
= −
∈
⎧ ⎫− + −⎪ ⎪= − ⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪+ +⎩ ⎭
+ +
∑
 (B.15) 
Combining (B.6) and (B.15),  the social welfare function can be written as 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
2 21
0 ,0 1 2 1, 2,
1 0
3
2 22 1
, , 1
1
0 21
1 2
3
1 (1 )
2
. .
ˆ ˆ ( ) var ( )
2
ˆ(1 )
. .
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j k t t
t t
j j j
j t j j t i N ttk j j j j
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W W Ku k k
t i p O a
k k y iKu q
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α α σ β
α δ η υ θ ωδ υβ
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= =
−∞ − ∈
=
= −
= − − −
+ +
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤− + +⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥= − ⎣ ⎦⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪+ −⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
+ +
∑ ∑
∑∑
 (B.16) 
Finally, combining ( )2 2,
0 0
ˆvar ( )
(1 )(1 )j
jt t A
i N t j t
t tj j
y i
γ θβ β πγ γ β
∞ ∞
∈
= =
= − −∑ ∑  and (B.16), 
the welfare function can be written as17 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
2 2 22
, , 1 ,
1
0
0 21
1 2
3
ˆ ˆ
1
2
ˆ(1 )
. .
j j j A
j t j j t j tt j j j j jk
t
R
t
k k
qW Ku
q
t i p O a
α δ η θυ πδ υ ϕβ
α α σ
∞ −
=
= −
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+ +
∑∑
  
                                                          
17 See Woodford (2003, Chapter 6). 
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